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COMMENT
STATE COURT ASSERTION OF POWER TO DETERMINE
AND DEMAND ITS OWN BUDGET
INTRODUCTION

Two principles have had much to do with the position of the
judiciary in American state government. One of these, the doctrine
of judicial independence, has roots antedating the Constitution. The
other, the doctrine of judicial inherent powers, has served in part as
a means to that end. Supposedly belonging to courts by their very
nature, these inherent or incidental powers usually have been used by
judges to control their courtrooms or court personnel; occasionally,
however, they have been used for the purpose of preserving judicial
integrity or independence from other governmental units.
Faced with fiscal dependence upon the legislature, some state
courts have begun to invoke their inherent powers in support of a new
doctrine-judicial fiscal independence. Their analysis begins with the
premises that courts must be completely independent from the other
branches and that courts must have adequate powers within themselves
to preserve this separation. More particularly, courts must be able to
use their powers to obtain adequate funding, the sine qua non of selfsufficiency. Judicial independence, it is presumed, depends on this
ability.
In two recent cases before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
Commonwealth ex rel. Carrollv. Tate,1 and Glancey v. Casey,2 judicial
claims to fiscal powers, heretofore asserted only occasionally in narrow
contexts, have adopted a broader theory of fiscal autonomy. Because
of its implications and the amount of money involved, Tate represents
the greatest advance yet by the champions of judicial fiscal independence. Whether its holding has been disturbed by the court's
subsequent decision in Glancey is not yet entirely clear. 3
In Tate, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, with modifications, the lower court's mandamus compelling Philadelphia's mayor
and city council to appropriate additional funds for the court of
common pleas of that city.4 The dispute began in December, 1969,
with the submission by the court of its budget estimates for the fiscal
year ending July 1, 1971, to the city's finance director. The original
1442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
2 447 Pa. 77, 288 A.2d 812 (1972).
3 See notes 14-25 infra & accompanying text.
4 The city petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, but without
any real expectation of success. Certiorari was denied, Tate v. Pennsylvania ex rel
Jamieson, 402 U.S. 974 (1971). The petition asserted tenuous claims under the
one-man/one-vote principle and under the guarantee of a republican form of government. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 3, 6-9, Tate v. Pennsylvania ex rel.
Jamieson, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
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request of $19.7 million was pared to $16.5 million and submitted to
the city council in April, 1970. The court requested an additional
$5.2 million in hearings before the council held the following month.
When the council denied the additional funds, approving only the
mayor's April request, the court sought mandamus to compel budgeting
of the additional sums.'
Superior Court Judge Harry M. Montgomery, specially designated
by the supreme court to try the case, ruled that the relator court had the
burden of proof in showing that its demands were reasonably necessary
for it to perform its functions, but barred the city from presenting
evidence bearing on inefficient use of the court's present budget. Disallowing ten of the twenty-two items requested,6 Judge Montgomery
awarded the court $2.5 million.7 Both parties appealed. The supreme
court affirmed, one judge dissenting as to the disallowance of one item.'
The broad language of Chief Justice John C. Bell's opinion for the
court suggests the adoption of a fundamental theory on the position
of the judiciary in a government of divided powers, the theory that the
independence of the judicial branch requires ultimate fiscal autonomy:
[T]he Judiciary must possess the inherent power to determine and compel payment of those sums of money which
are reasonable and necessary to carry out its mandated responsibilities, and its powers and duties to administer Justice,
if it is to be in reality a co-equal, independent Branch of our
Government.9
Absent this power, in the chief justice's view, the judiciary would be
The Tate holding, accordingly, looks
at the mercy of the legislature.'
to the court as the appropriate body to determine its own needs. Although the burden is on the court to demonstrate that its requests are
reasonably necessary to its proper functioning, it is the reasonableness
of the court's-not the legislature's-determination that is at issue.
Moreover, the court's determination is to be considered without regard
to such economic and budgetary factors as the financial condition of
the county 11 and the possible inefficiency in the court's use of funds
already within its control.'" Finally, fiscal self-determination may be
5 442 Pa. at 47-48, 274 A.2d at 194-95.
61d. at 49-50, 274 A.2d at 195-96.
7 The court reduced the amount it requested proportionately, to reflect the passage
of three months of the fiscal year. Id. In like manner, the final award by the
supreme court was reduced to less than $1.4 million. Id. at 57, 274 A.2d at 200.
s Id. at 59-62, 274 A.2d at 204-06 (Roberts, J., dissenting in part) (bail project).
9Id. at 52, 274 A2d at 197 (emphasis in the original).
10 See id. at 52-53, 55, 274 A.2d at 197, 199. The word "legislature" is used
throughout this Comment to denote local as well as state-level legislative bodies.
lid. at 56, 274 A.2d at 199; cf. id. at 67, 274 A.2d at 202 (Pomeroy, J.,
concurring). The court was not unanimous in taking this position; for an opposing
view, see id. at 58-59, 274 A.2d at 203-04 (Jones, J., concurring).
12The court in Tate did not discuss Judge Montgomery's evidentiary ruling in
this regard, but in its affirmance implicitly endorsed the ruling. Ironically part of
the Tate court's rationale, finding expression throughout the opinion, was the need
to promote efficient operation of the courts. See id. at 53-58, 274 A.2d at 197-200.
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invoked, as in Tate, not only to maintain the status quo, but also to
fund expansion, both quantitative and qualitative, in the administration
of justice. 3
In Glancey,'4 the court appears to have cut back on Tate's more
far-ranging implications. The Glancey court denied the request of the
judges of the newly-constituted Philadelphia Municipal Court that
mandamus issue to order that their salaries be paid retroactively to
their assumption of office.' 5 The court maintained that it was powerless to override the legislature's express provision of a somewhat
shorter period of retroactivity. 6 In its opinion, the court all but
abandoned inherent-power rhetoric.' 7 At the same time, somewhat inconsistently, it held to its position that the legislature had a constitutional duty, even in the absence of the express constitutional provisions theretofore obtaining,'" to provide "adequate" compensation to
the judiciary.' 9 Such compensation was necessary in order to preserve
the separation of powers.
The Glancey court read the 1968 constitution 20 as giving the
legislature sole authority to set the level of judicial compensation as
long as it was "adequate"-a standard which the court considered met
by the retroactive compensation paid. 2 The court distinguished Tate
13 Id. at 56, 274 A.2d at 199. Illustrative is the Philadelphia court of common
pleas' involvement in applications of data processing technology to judicial administration. See note 90 infra.
14 447 Pa. 77, 288 A.2d 812 (1972).
15 The judges took office Jan. 1, 1969, when the municipal court came into being
to replace the city's magistrates' courts. See PA. CoNsT. art. V, § 1. All 22 of the
newly-appointed judges had formerly been magistrates; in the absence of legislation
fixing a higher salary, the state's auditor general and treasurer-the defendants in
Glancey-paid the newly appointed judges the same salaries they had received as
magistrates. 447 Pa. at 80-82, 288 A.2d at 814.
16 On Oct. 17, 1969, the commonwealth's General Assembly enacted into law a
salary scale for the new judges, see Act of Oct. 17, 1969, Pub. L. No. 259, §2
(codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §711.2 (Supp. 1971)), but provided that the
higher salaries should apply retroactively only to July 1, 1969. For the 6 months
under dispute, the 22 judges received an aggregate of nearly $139 thousand at the
magistrates' rates, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §1138(B) (1966), but would have
received more than $190 thousand had the new scale been made retroactive to cover
that period. See 447 Pa. at 80-82, 288 A.2d at 814-15.
17 The opinion in Glancey was written by Benjamin R. Jones, who succeeded
the retired Bell as Chief Justice. In Tate, Mr. Justice Jones concurred in the result,
insisting that the reasonable necessity of the court's financial needs could not be
determined apart from consideration of the city's financial position and of the other
demands on its budget, but noting to his satisfaction that the additional funds
requested for the judiciary in Tate had already been set aside. 442 Pa. at 58-59,
274 A.2d at 203-04.
'8 The constitutions of 1790, 1838, and 1874 provided that judges should "receive
for their services an adequate compensation." PA. CoNsT. art. V, § 2 (1790); PA.
CONST. art. V, § 2 (1838); PA. CoNsT. art. V, § 18 (1874). The 1968 constitution
provided only that judicial compensation should be as "provided by law." PA.
CoxsT. art. V, §16(a).
19 See 447 Pa. at 83-88, 288 A.2d at 815-17.
20 See note 18 supra.
21 But cf. 447 Pa. at 89-91, 288 A.2d at 818-19 (Pomeroy, J., concurring)
(constitutional adequacy of the compensation paid for judges' first 6 months in office
not placed in issue). See also id. at 88, 288 A.2d at 817-18 (majority opinion)
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as "patently inapposite" simply on the ground that it did not involve
judicial salaries. 2 This distinction with its implicit premise-in support of which, presumably, Tate may be cited-that the legislature
lacks such ultimate control over other judicial expenditures, may appear strained. But at least it makes clear, Tate's implications notwithstanding, the court's reluctance to lock horns in a direct interbranch
confrontation at the state level.3 In that regard, Glancey may serve to
underscore the ultimate untenability of the separation-of-powers/essentiality-of-judicial-independence argument made in Tate.24 Whether or
not Tate is still the law in Pennsylvania,2 5 however, is relatively unimportant. What remains significant is that it suggests the path
judges everywhere may be tempted to take.
Tate offers a superficially inviting path for other state courts to
follow. In the major urban areas which are engulfed in a rising tide
of financial difficulties,26 it provides an apparently easy opportunity to
occupy the highest fiscal ground: even if an action for mandamus is not
actually brought, its availability can serve to intimidate city councils
and mayors. Closer scrutiny of the fiscal autonomy doctrine, however,
suggests the position held out by Tate may be untenable. Precedent,
theory, and policy alike appear to offer insufficient support.
I. PRECEDENT

Initially, the arsenal of precedent on the judiciary's inherent
powers, of which the citations in Tate represent only a sample,27 seems
to support the broad proposition that courts possess
("Even after the legislature acted it penalized appellants by failing to compensate
them in a manner commensurate with both their duties and the performance of such
duties.").
22
Id. at 84, 288 A.2d at 816.
23 In Pennsylvania, judges' salaries are paid from the state treasury. The state
constitution provides: "Justices, judges and justices of the peace shall be compensated
by the Commonwealth as provided by law." PA. CoNsT. art. V, § 16(a) (emphasis
added).
Other court expenses, generally, are paid by the county governments. This is
provided not by constitutional requirements, but rather by a welter of statutes. See,
e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 947 (jury commissioners), 1275 (jury commission
operations, second-class counties), 1520 (deputy prothonotaries, first-class counties),
1810 (stenographers' transcripts), 1832 (court clerks, first-class counties), 1837
(clerical assistants, fourth-class counties), 1861 (constables, criers, and tipstaves),
1876 (court janitors, counties with populations of at least 1.2 million) (1962).
24 See generally notes 61-69, 102-10 infra & accompanying text
25 Perhaps Glancey should be read as simply establishing an outer limit for the
applicability of Tate. The court's distinction of Tate, see note 22 supra & accompanying text, is not without theoretical basis, cf. note 75 infra & accompanying text,
and at least indicates an intent not to disturb, albeit not to extend, Tate's holding.
Justice Pomeroy, concurring in Glancey, complained that mandamus was sought
against the wrong parties defendant, and, citing Tate, left open the possibility that
an action in mandamus might lie against the legislature were it to fail to provide
adequate judicial compensation. See 447 Pa. at 89-91 & n.2, 288 A.2d at 818-19 & n.2.
26 See notes 84-86 infra & accompanying text.
27 442 Pa. at 52-53, 274 A.2d at 197. For a comprehensive summary of this
precedent, see J. CARIGAN, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS (National College
of State Trial Judges, 5th rev. 1970).
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the inherent power to determine and compel payment of those
sums of money which are reasonable and necessary to carry
out its mandated responsibilities, and its powers and duties to
administer Justice ....

2

Examination of the precursors of the fiscal autonomy theory, however,
will show the inadequate basis prior cases provide for the direction
taken by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Prior resorts to inherent
power have involved direct control of the judicial process,29 expenditure of rather small sums (most often, in emergencies)," defeat
of threatened usurpations of judicial power, 1 sharing of control with
other branches of government, 32 or preservation of traditional judicial
prerogatives. 33 None of these uses were in question in Tate.
A. Control of Adjudicative Proceedings
Not surprisingly, a great deal of inherent-power precedent pertains
to the situation presenting the most compelling case for resort to that
power-the control and protection of pending adjudications. 4 This
category embraces the control of court personnel and of court records
that must be kept private to protect the integrity of adjudications 3
Similarly, control of the jury during a trial has occasioned invocation
of inherent powers, even to the extent of incurring expenses for which
provision must be made later by the legislative branch.3 6 Even where
so close a nexus obtains between the exercise of the court's power and
its primary (adjudicatory) function, however, these powers appear to
have been conceived of as emergency measures-actions taken for
want of any other alternative. 7
In contrast, Tate involved no immediate threat to an adjudication.
In fact, it presented no exercise of control over a pending case, a courtroom, or court records.
28442 Pa. at 52, 274 A.2d at 197.
29See notes 34-37 infra & accompanying text.
30 See notes 38-41 infra & accompanying text.
31 See
32 See

notes 42-46 infra & accompanying text.

notes 47-49 infra & accompanying text.
notes 50-55 infra & accompanying text.
34
See, e.g., Belvin v. City of Richmond, 85 Va. 574, 8 S.E. 378 (1888) (judge
ordered street outside courtroom roped off when street-noise would have interfered
with proceedings).
35 The court also must exercise authority over those handling its records.
See State ex reL. Schneider v. Cunningham, 39 Mont. 165, 101 P. 962 (1909)
(stenographer) ; it re Janitor of Supreme Court, 35 Wis. 410 (1874) (janitor/
librarian).
36But see Schmelzel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 16 Idaho 32, 100 P. 106
(1909) (haircuts and shaves not reasonably necessary expenses).
37 Reference to the existence of "emergencies" or "exigencies" in these cases is
common; see, e.g., Stowell v. Board of Supervisors, 57 Mich. 31, 33, 34, 23 N.W.
557, 558 (1885) (dictum); Commissioners v. Hall, 7 Watts 290, 291 (Pa. 1838).
The nature of the power was explicitly formulated in these terms in State ex rel.
Hillis v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320, 329, 137 P. 392, 395 (1913) (dictum).
33 See
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B. Small Expenditures
Much of the claim to precedential support for the fiscal autonomy
doctrine rests upon instances where a court has successfully directed
the legislative branch to pay court expenses. Such incursions into the
public till have occurred, but these were essentially of an immediate,
38
emergency nature. Moreover, under the rule developed by the courts,
payment comes only after the bill is incurred. This factor limits the
amount that realistically can be spent. While an innkeeper may be
willing to house one jury on credit, 9 or a businessman may provide
courtroom furnishings on such terms, 40 such a procedure patently cannot fund an entire judicial branch. The relative smallness of the
amounts involved in these cases may serve also to explain their acceptability: they could be considered, so far as the other branches of
government were concerned, tolerable aberrations from the system. 4'
In cases dealing with an annual budget, as in Tate, however, not only
is the money demanded in advance of its expenditure, but the sums
involved can be enormous.
C. Defensive Uses of Inherent Powers
Historically courts have responded to actions by coordinate
branches which they see as threatening their existence or proper exercise of functions.4 2 For example, courts have invalidated laws requiring judges to accept cases not within a constitutional grant of
jurisdiction 41 or stripping judges of their power to suspend sentences."
Mere refusal by courts to sanction the action of another branch affecting their business or operation is essentially passive or defensive in
nature and may be distinguished from the type of offensive action taken
in Tate under the fiscal autonomy theory. In Tate, rather than fail to
endorse action already taken, the court actively intervened in the
legislative process. The power asserted is more potent and has more
serious implications for interbranch relations.
A precondition to the defensive use of inherent powers has been
the improper or unconstitutional action of another branch. Thus in
38 The rule is an "authority to incur and order paid" expenses. Schmelzel v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 16 Idaho 32, 35, 100 P. 106, 107 (1909) (dictum).
39 See Commissioners v. Hall, 7 Watts 290 (Pa. 1838).
40 See State ex rel. Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373, 68 P. 689 (1902).
41 Courts have, for example, drawn sharp distinctions between expenditures
incurred in necessary repair work and funds desired for major capital expendituresthe latter being deemed less appropriately a matter for resort to inherent power.
See Board of Comm'rs v. Gwin, 136 Ind. 562, 36 N.E. 237 (1894) (dictum) ; It re
Court, 162 Ohio St. 345, 123 N.E.2d 521 (1954).
42 The use of inherent powers frequently has been characterized as a protective
measure. See, e.g., State ex rel. Gentry v. Becker, 351 Mo. 769, 778, 174 S.W.2d
181, 183 (1943) (contempt power) ; In re Waugh, 32 Wash. 50, 51, 72 P. 710, 710
(1903) (dictum).
43 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
44
See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 (1971).
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45
Leahey v. Farrell,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that a court
must comply with the "reasonable fiscal regulations of the legislature"
unless the legislature had acted "arbitrarily or capriciously."

Should the legislature, or the county salary board, act arbitrarily or capriciously and fail or neglect to provide a sufficient
number of court employees or for the payment of adequate
salaries to them, whereby the efficient administration of
justice is impaired or destroyed, the court possesses the
inherent power to supply the deficiency. Should such officials
neglect or refuse to comply with the reasonable requirements
46
of the court they may be required to do so by mandamus.
The situation where the legislature has acted arbitrarily or
capriciously in relation to the judiciary is distinguishable from the
situation where a court's reasonable budgetary requests have been
denied. The two are not equivalent because the denial of reasonable
budgetary requests from the judiciary may itself be reasonable if there
is a good faith determination that other social needs are more important
and have a prior claim to the scarce resources in the public till. Leahey
appears to suggest that a precondition to defensive intervention by the
judiciary in legislative affairs is bad faith action on the part of the
legislature or administrative agency. In Tate, however, there was no
claim that the legislature had acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad
faith. There was the mere claim that reasonable budgetary requests
had been denied. In Tate, rather than defend itself against an attack
on its position, the court itself interfered in a traditionally legislativ6
function.
D. Sharing Control
In the past, judges claiming inherent powers for themselves generally have not insisted on the premise, assumed in Tate, that the only
effective way to protect judicial interests in an area where another
branch is also involved is to obtain exclusive control. Rather, they
have recognized that the judiciary can share power with another
branch without jeopardizing its own independence. For example, the
contempt power and the writ power have been held subject to legislative
regulation, as long as the courts retain a minimum power to defend
themselves."
Similarly, control of the bar has been an area where the
legislature exerts at least a guiding influence.4" Responsibility for the
45 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949).
43 Id. at 58, 66 A2d at 580; ef. County of San Joaquin v. Budd, 96 Cal. 47, 53,
30 P. 967, 969 (1892) (state code of civil procedure provided narrow authority for
court action "to protect the superior court from any arbitrary or unreasonable action
of the board of supervisors . .
").
47 Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (1882)
(writ power). See cases cited in

H.

ROTTScHAEFER, H.AG
BO K OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 56 (1939).
48
See H. ROTTSCEAEFER, HANDBOOK OF AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

57
(1939) ; Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A.J. 635, 638 (1935)
(legislature may set minimum requirements for admission to practice).
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rules of procedure of the courts has usually existed as a shared function,
in a manner reflecting the intertwining of substance and procedure and
a desire for a legislative check where substantive policy is made.4 9
Budget determinations clearly concern the legislature, central to whose
functions are the powers to tax and to appropriate public funds. Tate,
however, rejects cooperative approaches.
E. Retention of TraditionalPrerogatives
Prior practice has been a frequently asserted justification for
actions or requests by the courts. In 1857, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court relied on prior practice when it concluded that "the usage (of
counties bearing court expenses) is sufficient to make the law." 10 In
In re Surcharge of County Commissioners,5 the court concluded that a
common pleas judge should be provided a stenographer because every
other common pleas judge previously had been provided with one.52
Prior practice, however, offers only weak support for the courts in
taking steps toward fiscal autonomy; in fact, history records an increase
in judicial reliance on legislative provision for the courts' support. In
England, judges' sharing of court fees and selling of patronage positions-elements conducive to judicial independence from the legislature-were abolished during the legislature's early nineteenth century
reforming of the judiciary.53 Similarly, in the United States, the
widespread acceptance of the principles that judges must not have
financial interests in their cases " and that the judiciary should not
support itself through taxation of litigants, 55 has increasingly made the
courts more dependent upon legislative allotments. Thus, in invoking
mandamus to dictate its own budget, a court cannot base its claim in
tradition. Rather, the court arrogates to itself a new power, one
historically exercised by the legislature.
49 Cf. Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 259, 74 A.2d 406, 416 (1950) (Case,
J., concurring) ; Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rulemaking:
A Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1, 14-24 (1958). Winberry,
an exception to policies of concurrent control, may exemplify the defensive nature
of court power taken to an extreme. There, the court may have been reacting to
the threat of the legislature's taking the entire rulemaking process into its own
hands. See id. 29.
50 McCalmont v. County of Allegheny, 29 Pa. 417, 419 (1857).
51 12 Pa. D. & C. 471 (C.P. Lackawanna 1928).
52 Id. at 474, 483-84. The reliance on custom has at times been made explicit;
see, e.g., In re Janitor of Supreme Court, 35 Wis. 410, 417 (1874) ("the appointment [of the court janitor] should be made as has heretofore been the custom . .. ").
53 Lederman, The Independence of the Judiciary, 34 CAN. B. REv. 769, 789 (1956).
The reason for the change, of course, was that while such financial arrangements
produced independence vis-A-vis the other branches, they did not produce independence
in its other sense (not relevant in this Comment) of neutrality in dealing with litigants. The latter apparently was deemed more important, and the solution England
chose was the replacement of the scandal-prone fee system with the provisionthrough the legislature-of more generous judicial salaries. See id.
54 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (denial of due process).
55 See Saari, An Overview of Financing Justice in America, 50 3. Am. JuD.
Soc'y 296, 297-300 (1967).
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F. Summary: Prior Case Support for the Tate Result
One state supreme court justice has observed that "courts have
indulged in more or less loose expressions concerning [inherent
powers]." " In fact these powers have been asserted and exercised
in only a limited number of situations to achieve a few narrowly defined goals. Often the cases involving judicial claims to power have
been decided on the basis of a statute; 5 while spawning much dicta,
they have established little in the way of generally applicable rules or
principles.5" In particular, the cases involving public monies have required only minimal outlays.59 These cases have been cited subsequently, however, with little attempt to separate holding from dicta.6
Tate goes beyond the narrow range of uses, limited at its core to
direct control over adjudications, heretofore permitted to judicial
inherent powers. In Tate the concept of inherent powers was used
offensively and to preclude concurrent control of court-related functions
with another branch. Broad declarations of judicial independence
notwithstanding, Tate finds only limited support in the small number
of prior cases where judges have exercised control over public money.
II. THEORY
While Tate finds only weak support in prior cases, various
theoretical underpinnings might be advanced to support the Tate result.
The most obvious are the inherent power and separation of power
theories. These must be considered against traditional notions concerning the nature of budgetary decisions. Generally the allocation of
scarce resources among competing demands is thought to be a political
decision to be made by the legislative branch.
A. Separation of Powers
Arguably no governmental unit can be truly independent if its level
of income is determined not by itself, but by another-sometimes
hostile-governmental unit. Thus fiscal autonomy seems to be a natural
implication of the separation of powers doctrine accepted by the framers
and embodied in the Constitution. While ordinarily the need to cooperate with the legislature in planning the budget for the entire range
of governmental operations is conceded, judges should insist, the argu5

6 1 re Waugh, 32 Wash. 50, 51, 72 P. 710, 710 (1903).

57 Nash v. State ex rel. Black, 33 Ind. 78, 79 (1870); State ex rel. Schneider
v. Cunningham, 39 Mont. 165, 171, 101 P. 962, 964 (1909); State ex rel. Kitzmeyer
v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373, 68 P. 689 (1902).
5
sLeahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949) (decided on procedural
grounds); Young v. State Bank, 4 Ind. 301 (1853); In re Waugh, 32 Wash. 50, 72
P. 710 (1903) (decision against exercising power over a member of the bar).
59 See cases cited notes 35-41 supra & accompanying text.
60 But see In re Court, 162 Ohio St. 345, 351-61, 123 N.E.2d 521, 524-28 (1954)
(Taft, J.).
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ment goes,"' on an ultimate power to make a determination binding on
the legislature concerning court needs.
The difficulty with this line of reasoning is that it is premised on
a notion that the judiciary must be absolutely independent. This
premise both takes the separation of powers doctrine beyond its
historical bounds and conflicts directly with the corollary to that
theory-the concept of checks and balances. The concept of separate
powers in government, as developed by Montesquieu in his analysis of
the British constitution, 2 and as later commented upon by Madison in
The Federalist,3 "goes no farther than to prohibit any one of the
entire departments from exercising the powers of another department." 6' In his defense of the Constitution, which clearly embodied
the concept of division of government powers, Madison observed of the
states of the confederation that "there is not a single instance in which
the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate
and distinct." 65 Writing about the federal government, Joseph Story
noted that a limitation of powers could be best accomplished by an
occasional mixing of those powers.6 6
The court's argument in Tate that a court cannot be left dependent
on another branch runs squarely counter to what historically has been
the theoretical rationale for the separation of powers-the premise that
no group of men can be relied upon to limit their own powers. 67 Indeed
interbranch dependence is essential to any general division of powers.
This point was implicit in Montesquieu's ideal scheme of government,
in which an otherwise autonomous executive branch was designed to
be dependent on the legislature for the raising of money.68 It is also
implicit in the organization of the federal government where the courts
and executive agencies are manifestly dependent on Congress for their
financial support. 9
Logically, the judicial branch can have no greater constitutional
claim to autonomy or independence from other governmental units than
those units themselves. If the separation of powers doctrine may be
used by the courts to support claims of fiscal autonomy, it may be used
also by the legislature or the executive to oppose them. The legis61

See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193,
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
62 C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 149-82 (Hafner ed. 1949).
63
TH FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison).
64

Id. 328 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).

65 Id. 327. For a state court's acknowledgment of this position, see Board of
Comm'rs v. Gwin, 136 Ind. 562, 585-87, 36 N.E. 237, 244-45 (1894).
662

J.

STORY,

§ 539 (1833).
67 See C.
68

COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

MONTESQUIEU,

STATES

supra note 62, at 150.

See id. 160.

69 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, with id. § 9, cl. 7. Far from having
an independent life as a system, the entire federal judiciary inferior to the Supreme
Court is dependent for its very existence upon Congress. See id. art. III, § 1.
Congress' power over the judges' salaries is, of course, limited. See id.
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lature may claim, based on the separation of powers doctrine, that it
alone can determine the budget and allocate public resources among
competing public demands. Thus where competing claims of power
are involved, the separation of powers doctrine cannot really resolve
the issue. The doctrine can be shaped or molded to reinforce both
claims, however weakly supported by precedent or policy considerations.
B. Inherent Powers
While the concept of inherent judicial powers is generally accepted, 70 there is less agreement as to how these powers are to be
defined or limited. Various tests are possible including the intent of
the framers of the particular state or Federal Constitution in granting
judicial power to the courts 71 or the powers exercised by courts at the
time of the making of the constitution.72 Some judges apparently have
taken the view that their powers are limited only by their own notions
concerning the needs of an effective judiciary. Under this view, the
creation of a court implies the grant as well of a preordained, almost
inalienable, set of powers.7
This approach is an aberration from
democratic government. While the idea of an independent judiciary
is deeply ingrained in the American system, state constitutional history
does not support the assumption that the people were so concerned with
judicial independence that they were willing to pay the price of entrusting judges with unfettered power to define the extent of judicial
power. So free an 'interpretation of the role given the judges conflicts, for example, with the development during the Jacksonian era of
judicial election systems evidencing a decision on the part of the people
to sacrifice a measure of judicial independence in favor of a degree of
popular control.74
70

1 n re Surcharge of County Comm'rs, 12 Pa. D. & C. 471, 481-82 (C.P.

Lackawanna 1929).

See H.

ROTTSCHAEFER,

supra note 47, at 56; cf. New York

Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752 n.3 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 383 (1962) (dictum).
71 This is a more flexible perspective, since the people can decide to break away
from previous constitutional tradition. See Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74

A.2d 406 (1950).
72 The Indiana Supreme Court was decidedly inclined to this latter position in
State ex rel. Hovey v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 360-61, 21 N.E. 244, 248 (1889),
observing that constitutions do not solely create institutions.
73 The common constitutional provision that the "courts shall be open" has served
as the excuse for broad claims of judicial power. See Commonwealth.ex rel. Carroll
v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45 59-60, 274 A.2d 193, 204 (Roberts, J., concurring), cert. denied,

402 U.S. 974 (19715 ; Carlson v. State ex rel. Stodola, 247 Ind. 631, 637, 220 N.E.2d
532, 536 (1966) ; State ex rel. Weinstein v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 99, 100
(Mo. 1970). Contra State ex rel. Decker v. Stanfield, 34 Okla. 524, 528, 126
P. 239, 241 (1912).

In Little v. State, 90 Ind. 338 (1883), the Indiana Supreme Court asserted that

"purely judicial powers . . . are inalienable and indestructible. . . . It is, in truth,
impossible to conceive a superior court as existing without such a power." Id. at

339-40.
74See Lederman, The Independence of the Judiciary (pt. 2), 34 CAN. B. Rv.
1139, 1145 (1956). One commentator, however, has found judicial fiscal independence
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A study of intentions existing at the time the Federal Constitution
was framed offers little support for the proposition that judicial power
includes the power to determine a court's financial needs. Both
Madison and Hamilton sought provisions for financial security for
judges because they believed that the national legislature possessed exclusive power over public finances. 5 Likewise, the powers to tax and
appropriate public funds were associated generally with legislative institutions at the time the state constitutions were framed. The reasons
behind this allocation of functions are suggested by the nature of the
budgeting process.
C. Budgeting
76
Budgeting concerns the initial allocation of available resources.
Because the resources are usually insufficient to satisfy all demands in
full, budgeting often involves an assignment of priorities to competing
demands. This function has been thought legislative in nature because
the legislature is the branch of government designed to be most responsive to popular control.
Insofar as budgeting involves a determination of governmental
priorities, the Tate decision amounts to a declaration that the business
of the courts has the first priority. The implication of Tate is that a
court's budget is determined by the judges of the court after they have
considered what the court's business either is or ought to be.77 Both
standards fail to take into account the financial condition of the
county.
Since the county's resources are limited, the judges, in
directing resources to the courts, necessarily take them away from other
uses. It seems hardly reasonable to suppose that the people in establishing a judicial system intended to yield so much control over the
allocation of public money. If this were true of the courts, it would
appear to follow that the mere establishment of any function within a
more readily acceptable for states where judges, because elected, are accountable to
the people. Brennan, Judicial Fiscal Independence, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 277, 286-87
(1971). But cf. notes 102-04 infra & accompanying text.
75 "The judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the purse;
no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society . . . ." THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
See also id. No. 48,
at 334 (J. Madison); 2 J. STORY, supra note 66, at § 540. Accordingly, a strong
argument can be made-and it runs, of course, directly contrary to the Tate/Glancey
pattern-that the independence of the judiciary is adequately assured when judicial
salaries, but not other court expenses, are safeguarded from legislative manipulation.
76 The term budgeting may be used to refer either to macro-budgeting-the
initial allocation of resources to different units of government-or to micro-budgeting
-the determination by each unit of how they will use what is given them. In this
discussion, budgeting refers to macro-budgeting.
This distinction between the tAo kinds of budgeting is shown in the position
adopted by the National Conference of Court Administrators in 1965 and the Conference of Chief Justices in 1966. See The Need for Independence in Judicial
Administration, 50 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 129 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Independence]
(courts should exercise independent authority "[w]ithin the limits set by the funds
made generally available by law").
77 See 442 Pa. at 56, 274 A.2d at 199.
78 Id. at 58, 274 A.2d at 204 (Jones, J., concurring).
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constitutional government would include a similar grant of financial
control.
Budgeting involves not only a ranking of priorities but also the
assignment of governmental functions to different branches. For
example, an allocation of funds to courts for use in apprehending
fugitives " clearly constitutes an assignment of that function to the
judicial branch. The task of making such assignments, like the task
of ordering priorities, is often difficult and requires an objective evaluation of the nature and capabilities of each institution. Thus the
prospect of each branch or department determining for itself what
functions it will perform seems abhorrent to the rational development
of a constitutional government. Yet this is precisely the implication
of a judicial assertion of power to determine its own level of income.
Judges have not always proven reluctant to enter new areas or perform
new functions. From statutes delegating authority over probation
officers to the courts,"' judges have concluded that probation is a
judicial function. 8' In a case involving refusal by the board of county
commissioners to approve salaries fixed for employees of the District
Court for the Fourth Judicial District of Colorado, a Justice of the
Colorado Supreme Court observed: "[T] he judiciary has here not only
interfered with the legislative functions-it has completely occupied the
area involved."

82

Assertion by the courts of power to determine budgetary priorities
and to define their own functions may radically alter the current constitutional balance of responsibilities between branches. The allocation
of government functions is an ongoing development of the constitution,
in a political sense. With the reallocation of functions comes, commonly, a change in policy for the conduct of the function involved. It
would seem an elementary proposition in a representative government
that the people retain control over such policymaking, as over the determination of societal priorities, through the legislature."'
III. POLICY

The court in Tate was responding to some natural instincts as well
as some very real concerns. In determining whether the Tate result
79 Id. at 50, 274 A.2d at 196.
80 See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT.

§ 9-2212 (1956) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A :168-5, -8
ANN. §39-16-1 (1963).
81 See Noble County Council v. State ex tel. Fifer, 234 Ind. 172, 125 N.E.2d

(1971); CoLo. REv.

STAT.

709 (1955) ; In re Salaries for Probation Officers of Bergen County, 58 N.J. 422,
278 A.2d 417 (1971).
82 Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 53, 384 P.2d 738, 748 (1963)
(Hall, J.,
dissenting).
83 That such control was intended is attested to by the continuing legislative
power over the existence and jurisdiction of various courts. See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT.
art. III, §§ 1 (existence of inferior courts), 2 (appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court subject to exceptions and regulations of Congress) ; PA. CoNsT. art. V, §§ 2-4
(state courts' jurisdiction as "provided by law"), 5 (common pleas courts have
unlimited original jurisdiction "except as may otherwise be provided by law";
divisions and number of judges "provided by law").
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is sound in terms of policy, it is useful to consider what may have motivated the result in Tate as well as some of the effects a decision like
Tate is likely to have.
A. Motives
At least four factors may have influenced the result in Tate:
financial pressures, judicial activism, local political interference, and
natural bias.
1. Fiscal Crisis
An important factor leading to the result in Tate may have been
the court's desire to protect its financial position within the context of
the fiscal crisis confronting counties and cities generally. Local government is caught in a financial squeeze. Given limited taxing resources
at the outset, the local unit finds the use of substantial sums earmarked
before any considered budgeting of these resources can begin. In
Philadelphia, for example, the city council may find part of its budget
already locked in as a result of laws requiring arbitration of police and
firemen's pay disputes.84 In addition, labor contracts and emergency
expenditures further constrain the council's power to make budgetary
decisions.,' The result, not surprisingly, is heightened competition for
the funds remaining. Since local government finances the lower judiciary,"6 the courts are among those contending for these limited
resources.
At the same time, the felt need for financial resources has been
intensified by the new responsibilities placed upon the courts by the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court 87 and by the increased
demands on judicial services made by modern society."' The sense of
financial need is further heightened by a wish to remedy the deterioration of trial court justice, 9 itself a product of the financial squeeze, and
by the judges' personal desire to be innovative in their delivery of
existing services."
These considerations suggest why the court in
Tate was so readily lured by a doctrine that promised to protect its
84 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§217.1,-.10 (Supp. 1971).
85 Brief for Municipal Appellants at 5-6, Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate,

442 8Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).

6 See notes 22-23 supra & accompanying text. See also INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL

ADMINISTRATION,

STATE AND LOCAL FINANCING OF THE COURTS 14 (Tent. Report

1969) [hereinafter cited as FINANCING].
87 The impact of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), for example, can
be seen in State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966), with a state court
asserting fiscal power to handle expanded responsibilities.
88 See Independence, supra note 76, at 129; FINANCING, supra note 86, at 71.
89 See L. DOWNIE, JUSTICE DENIED (1971).
90 This is evident in the plaintiff court's desire in Tate to expand its use of data
processing equipment, an area in which it had already established leadership. See
Brief, supra note 85, at 47-48; Brief for Appellant Carroll at 69-70, Commonwealth
ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
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existing services and91 facilities by mandating the highest priority for
their financial needs.
2. Judicial Activism
Beyond a desire to protect existing services and facilities, the court
in Tate perhaps was motivated by the hope of maintaining its ability
to allow new judicial remedies (thus substantially increasing existing
caseloads) in areas where the legislature had failed to take necessary
action. Miranda v. Arizona 2 is a good example of such judicial activism, although the impact of this decision on the financial needs of
individual courts is less than clear. Others include the minority rule
that a court has power to order the payment of an indigent's appointed
counsel even in the absence of an authorizing statute. 3 This rule may
prove an important precedent for further aggressive judicial actions
and expenditures in areas such as bail, 4 speedy trial, 5 and cruel and
unusual punishment. 6
3. Political Pressures
A court may well be motivated to free itself from felt political
interference. Reaction to political influence has been present in previous
inherent power cases, particularly where the power to appoint and pay
judicial adminstrative officers has been at issue. 7 This factor is present
in the Tate case as well. In the setting of Pennsylvania state and local
politics, the decision stands in part as a declaration of judicial independence.
The felt need for a declaration of political independence may be
attributed in part to a sense of domination by local politicians. In
Pennsylvania, the system of electing judges and the limited tenure given
91 Recent activity by courts claiming inherent fiscal powers has taken place in
St. Louis and Detroit. See State ex rel. Weinstein v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d
99 (Mo. 1970); Wayne Circuit judges v. Wayne County, 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d
228 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972). For a reading, perhaps too sanguine,
of the situation and the trends, see Brennan, supra note 74, at 278-80.
92384 U.S. 436 (1966) (pre-interrogation "warnings"). As another example,
see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (exclusionary rule).
93Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d
405 (1940); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966) (decision based on
statute placing cost of criminal prosecution on counties) ; Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 804,
830-35 (1968).
04See Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 60, 274 A.2d 193,
204 (Roberts, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
95
See United States ex rel. Frizer v. McMann, 437 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1971).
This has enormous potential for exploitation by courts seeking to expand their
operations purportedly for the purpose of avoiding delays. See Castle v. State, 237
Ind. 96
83, 143 N.E.2d 570 (1957).
See Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110
(1971).
9
7See, e.g., In re Appointment of the Clerk, 297 S.W.2d 764, 764 (Ky. 1957)
("on the surface this is a fight over patronage") ; In re Court Officers, 3 Pa. Dist.
196 (C.P. Bucks 1893).
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them have contributed to what some see as an undesirable subservience
of the judges to politicians."
An additional factor may be the attitudes of local officials towards
lower level courts. Local officials have viewed courts which are locally
financed as mere departments of the local city councils." Others may
compare the courts, which although locally financed are still subject to
state control in the form of review by the state supreme court, to other
locally financed but state controlled programs. Already forced to pay
substantial sums for state initiated programs, 10 0 county officials are not
likely to be enthusiastic over other requests for local funds made by state
controlled institutions.
In reaction to the perceived attitude of local officials, the courts
have developed a distrust of local councils and executives making the
local domination that does exist that much more intolerable. By asserting inherent budgetary powers, the court in Tate may have hoped
to escape the most serious consequences of local political hostility or
domination.
4. Bias
While there is no substantial evidence on the matter, courts may
be influenced by unarticulated premises as to the personal qualities of
judges. Seeing themselves as intrinsically different from others who
wield power, courts at times have assumed that others can depend on
their sense of propriety as a safeguard against their misuse of power.'
This assumption together with an underlying belief in their own enlightened progressivism may lead courts to claim new aggrandized
powers.
B. Effects
If, through judicial fiscal autonomy, the courts would be able to
escape the urban fiscal crisis, to provide needed judicial innovations, to
eliminate political interference, and to produce a wiser-because judgedirected-allocation of society's resources, Tate's departure from precedent and traditional political theory might still be justified. At first
glance, the Tate result seems reasonably calculated to achieve the
court's apparent goals. More money is extracted from the city or
county, and a precedent for greater freedom in the planning and funding of operations is established. In crucial aspects, however, these
gains are illusory; neither judicial independence nor sounder budgetary
decisions are in fact likely to be achieved. What is worse, the court's
08 Interview with Henry Reath, Esq., counsel for the common pleas court in
Tate, in Philadelphia, Oct. 29, 1971.
99 FINA cING, supra note 86, at 52.
100 Note 84 supra & accompanying text.
10 See Commissioners v. Hall, 7 Watts 290, 291 (Pa. 1838).
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short-run victory may be accompanied by side-effects-particularly in
terms of damage to the court's prestige-more than offsetting its
monetary gains. These factors cast serious doubt upon the wisdom
of the policy pursued by the court.
1. The Danger to Judicial Independence
While intended to free the judiciary from political interference,
the Tate result in fact may have the opposite effect. Since it involves a
determination of priorities, budgeting is essentially a political act.102
Thus a judiciary which performs this function runs the danger of being
politicized.
Under the Tate approach, judicial exercise of fiscal powers would
not be checked by normal legislative discretion. Of course judges remain reviewable by "impeachment, removal, or appeal to the people,
say for a constitutional change or the defeat of some allegedly overactivistic Justice or Justices." 103 Although such political checks have
been shunned in the past as extreme, a court's exercise of fiscal control
may spark feelings that extreme countermeasures are justified. If the
political forces in society whose interests are attuned to the government's budget are blocked in their usual channels, it is unlikely they
would simply surrender.
The judiciary, accordingly, may achieve fiscal autonomy but may
find itself called to account for its expenditures in judicial elections. 0 4
Moreover, threats by the judges to use inherent powers may be
countered by threats of impeachment, tighter control of judicial nominations and shorter terms of office. Charges of judicial fiscal irresponsibility, and public appeals by legislators, aimed at blaming the courts for
spending and tax increases, may become common. Finally, cutbacks
in jurisdiction may be employed as a substitute means of regulating
judicial spending; ultimately, recourse may be sought in constitutional
amendments imposing broad controls on the judiciary.
These political dangers do not presuppose actual judicial abuse.
Rather, they may follow upon the felt probability that judicial entrance
into an intrinsically political sphere would lead ineluctably to further
political activity. Having once asserted this new power over the
budget, the judges may well find the residual, highly political means of
control stubbornly retained and vigorously employed to check their
new power.
102

See generally text accompanying notes 76-83 supra.

103 Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 383 Mich. 10, 33, 172 N.W.2d 436,
445 (1969) (Black, J., separate opinion), opinion of Black & Dethmers, JJ., adopted
on rehearing,386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972).
See PA. CoNsT. art. V, § 18, art. VI, §§ 6-7.
104 In response to public pressure to reduce overall government expenditures, a
candidate for judicial office could, for example, find himself forced to pledge that he
will not be the one to bring about higher expenses and increased taxes.
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2. The Impact Upon Budgeting Decisions
As noted previously, 105 a court asserting power to determine the
amount of public money it will receive may be motivated in part by
confidence that courts have greater wisdom and make better decisions
than legislatures. In fact, such confidence particularly in the budget
area is uncalled for. By divorcing itself from legislative control, the
court also eliminates input from the branch most suited to fact and
opinion gathering through public hearings and politically sensitive
representatives. Insulation from outside interference may be achieved
only at the cost of insulation from constructive inputs.
To an extent, it is in the nature of things that an autonomous
judiciary acting in isolation could not deal effectively with the broad
policy questions involved in budgeting. The administration of justice
involves the actions of all branches of government; its problems may
not be readily solved by piecemeal, isolated efforts. Coordinated
budget decisions would seem essential.10 6
Additionally, self-interest may detract from the quality of budget
decisions made by the courts alone. As one commentator has suggested, "[j]udges . . . have vested interests in maintaining the
status quo in our trial courts," since they "like their autonomy, their
short working hours and special privileges, despite the confusion and
injustice all around them." 107 If this is true, judicial fiscal autonomy
will make it more difficult to introduce to the courts such reforms as
modern management and more efficient use of personnel. The warning
of experience is that the power exclusively to determine the rate of
progress is also the power to impede progress.0 8
3. Impact Upon Public Trust in the Judiciary
The Tate result not only fails to insure judicial independence from
political pressures or better allocation of resources; it threatens to
cause serious damage to the public regard for the judiciary. This is
so for three reasons: the substantive implications of the budget decisions, the appearance of partiality, and the ill-suitedness of courts for
interbranch confrontation.
105 Note 101 supra & accompanying text.
106 Saari, supra note 55, at 300.
1.07 L. DOWNIE, supra note 89, at 208.
108 See State ex rel. Hovey v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 21 N.E. 244 (1889), where
the court's resistance to innovation in the judicial system took on the aspect of an
epic defense of judicial integrity: the legislature's creation of court commissioners
to aid the supreme court was denounced as an invasion of the judges' domain.
However, other states have successfully used court commissioners as adjuncts to the
courts. Cain, Congested Dockets and Measures for Relief, 9 NoTRE DAME LAW. 117,
123-25 (1934).
L. DOWNIE, supra note 89, at 131-40, 208, notes that the vested interests of
judges and lawyers in preserving the present system is one of the major obstacles
to reform of this system.
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The court's insistence on top priority in the budget would lead to
grave consequences as the financial resources of the county became
more strained. Since the Tate approach makes no attempt to weigh
the need for more court clerks against, for example, the need for more
police, it undoubtedly makes it more difficult for the county to allocate
the available resources in the way which most efficiently meets the
community's demands. This invites public criticism of the court and
its personnel.
Public willingness to accept and abide by court decisions depends,
in large measure, upon the court's reputation as a fair and disinterested
tribunal. Thus a court should seek to avoid involvement in situations
where even the possibility of partiality oh its part might be suggested.
Such a situation is presented, however, whenever a court claims and
exercises power to determine its own financial needs and resource
allocation. While the action taken in Tate is obviously distinct from
ordinary adjudication, the court's perceived lack of sensitivity to the
possibility of its own prejudice is indicative of how it might perform
when other cases are before it.
Finally, if the theory that separation of powers mandates fiscal
autonomy is to be held with logical integrity, the courts would be hard
pressed to deny the request of a mayor, governor, or agency head that
a writ of mandamus be issued to order the appropriation of funds
necessary for his activities." 9 Moreover, if the writ is denied, the
executive officer may simply refuse, in retaliation, to enforce the court's
own order to produce the funds it considers necessary for its own
functions. Then the court would find itself committed to an unenforceable order. So dramatic a demonstration of the court's ultimate
impotence, particularly on an issue involving self-interest, could do
incalculable damage to the court's prestige and effectiveness."10
To summarize: the path taken by Tate cannot be approved as a
model for other state judges. The Tate result both lacks precedential
and theoretical support, and fails to effect desirable policy results.
While the use of the inherent fiscal powers doctrine in the short run
may coerce local governments to provide the courts with additional
309 Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193 (Jones,

J., concurring), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971):

The brief for the court in Tate differentiated the executive from the judiciary
on the basis of the.former's recourse to the electorate. Brief for Appellant (Common
Pleas Court), app. at 19-20, Commonwealth ex -el. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274
A.2d 193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971). While this may be reassuring for some,
it is of questionable weight as a constitutional argument, and practically meaningless
to city managers and the various executive agencies and commissions purposely
insulated from the political arena. The line is most illusory where funding is needed
for an administrative agency with adjudicatory functions.
110 It is not difficult to envision a reenactment of the judicial defeat that followed
upon Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). "When Jackson was
asked what effort the Executive Department would make to back up the Court's
mandate, he is reported to have said: 'John Marshall has made his decision; now
let him enforce it." E. CoRwIiN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION 194
(1919).

1206

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.120:1187

funds, it invites extreme and bitter political counter-attack, creates a
budgeting procedure of doubtful value in meeting societal needs, and
threatens to diminish the prestige of the courts as an institution.

IV. ALTERNATIVES
To conclude that Tate should not be endorsed as a viable solution
to a court's financial problems is not, of course, to detract from the
legitimate need for funds that does exist. In fact, the administration
of justice receives minimal financing on every level in America, relative
to other governmental functions.1 11 As has been discussed, however,
seizure by the courts of fiscal power may not be a rational answer.
Given that society's financial resources are limited, there is little
possibility of a final solution that would assure courts of an adequate
income level in the judges' eyes. Attention must be directed not
toward ultimate cures, but rather toward practical steps that would
mitigate the financial difficulties of the courts without losing sight of
other societal values. At least four such steps are feasible: changing
the source of judicial funds, increasing interbranch budgetary cooperation, removing political shackles from the judges, and more
effective lobbying by the organized bar.
A. Funding Sources
An important first step toward relieving financial strains on the
judiciary would be to remove their financing entirely from the hardpressed counties. Placing this responsibility wholly upon the state
would provide the courts with a sounder source of income, and also
would make funds available to the judiciary on a broader and more
uniform basis." 2 At the same time, it would remove a key cause of
conflict between the courts and local government and would thereby
improve prospects for cooperation at the local level in meeting the
needs of justice. A shift to state-level financing would be particularly
appropriate in states like Pennsylvania, that maintain a unified court
system." 3 In addition, an expanded financial role for the federal
government might be considered, at least to the extent that the federal
courts have occasioned new expenses through developments in constitutional law.""
B. Cooperation
The financial situation of the courts might also be improved, albeit
less directly, by creating procedures that facilitate communication and
111 Saari, supra note 55.

112 Id. 301-02. Given the fundamental importance of the governmental function
of administering justice, the equal protection clause might well mandate an end to
the variations local funding may produce in the quality of performance of that
function; cf. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
113 PA. CoNsT. art. V, § 1. See also Weis, A New Name and a New Financial

Policy for the Courts, 41 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 189 (1970).
114 Saari, supra note 55, at 301.
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cooperation between the courts and the other branches. Hopefully, a
deeper understanding of the needs of the judiciary would result, and
this in turn would produce a greater willingness on the part of the
other branches to meet the problems faced by courts.
Various approaches along this line are possible. Independent
commissions or interbranch committees could be established." 5 In
addition, analogies to other areas of shared power between the courts
and the legislature may suggest possible arrangements. A study of
state constitutional provisions for the legislative treatment of court
rules, for example, might spawn like procedures for the legislative approval of a proposed judicial budget."" In taking the path of structured budgetary cooperation, however, flexibility should be sought.
A protective mechanism hastily embedded into a constitution or statute
today may turn out to be an unwanted restriction under future
circumstances.
At the most extreme end of the spectrum, consideration may be
given to a constitutional provision requiring that a fixed minimum
amount or percentage of revenue be allotted to the judiciary. It must
be emphasized that this drastic alternative is advanced only for those
who take at face value the dicta about absolute judicial independence,
and who are animated by a belief that legislative abuse of the judiciary
is inevitable. Constitutionally set formulae are likely to prove unworkable due to the dynamics of the economy ...and the difficulty of
foreseeing future needs and judicial roles.
C. Political Independence
It was suggested previously 1s that a felt need for a declaration
of political independence may have been in part responsible for the Tate
result. To the extent this is true, constitutional or statutory reforms
ending judges' dependence in nonfiscal matters on local politics and
politicians would be useful. Such reforms might reduce a court's
sense of urgency in choosing a battleground for self-assertion. They
might encourage courts to feel freer in lobbying for judicial reforms
and more secure in negotiating for funds.
The drive for judicial independence is misplaced in the fiscal setting. It should be directed toward separating the judges from the
domination of the politicians, not toward isolating the courts from
cooperation and governmental interdependence. In a state in which
115 See, e.g., Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 54, 66 A.2d 577, 578 (1949)
board).

(salary

110 See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 49, at 6-9 n.36, 39-42.
117 Cf. THE FEDEA I.IST No. 79, at 532 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton):

"[W]ith regard to the judges, who, if they behave properly, will be secured in their
places for life, it may well happen, especially in the early stages of the government,
that a stipend, which would be very sufficient at their first appointment, would
become too small in the progress of their service." Inflation, of course, is still very

much with us.
118 Notes 98-100 supra & accompanying text.
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judges lack the security of life tenure, as is the case in Pennsylvania,"'
it would be wise to follow the example set by the Federal Constitution
in providing for tenure during good behavior..20 This provision was
deemed indispensable for instilling judges with an independent spirit at
the national level; 121 the need for such a provision is even greater on
the state level, where the tradition of an independent court system may
not be as strong.
D. Lobbying for Increased Allocations
The objectives of the judiciary go beyond mere preservation of
the status quo. They call for improvements in administering justice
that require innovation and expansion. To expand the judiciary's
share of the limited public funds available, or for that matter, even to
see adopted the reforms proposed above, those whose interests are
allied to an improved judicial system must enter the political marketplace.
Budgeting entails competition among governmental agencies for
the available public funds. In engaging in this competition, the courts
have been hampered by the absence of an effective lobby.' 22 Responsibility for this state of affairs belongs in large measure to the group
most closely associated with the court system-the bar. If it in fact
desires a more efficient administration of justice, the bar should accept
the duty of being the political voice of the judicial system.123

CONCLUSION

The unmistakable message-of Tate is the need for cooperation
among the branches of government. Those local and state government
officials who are farsighted enough to appreciate the trend signified by
Tate, and the underlying political and financial difficulties troubling the
judiciary, must act more responsively. Otherwise, the conflicts with
precedent, theory, and policy notwithstanding, the courts will fill the
void, invoking the inherent powers doctrine.
:19 PA. CONST. art. V,

§ 15.

120 U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 1.
3

21

See THE

FEDF.ALiST

No. 78 (A. Hamilton).

122 See L. DOWNIE, supra note 89, at 207-08.

One commentator has asked

rhetorically, "[c]ould it be that justice has few lobbies or programs and no central
spokesman to present needs to those who make final budgetary decisions?" Saari,
supra note 55, at 297.
123 Unfortunately, as one commentator has observed, there is a good deal of
apathy among attorneys and taxpayers in general. Many of the leading attorneys
may not even be aware of the problems of local trial courts, because the level of
their practice keeps them outside of such courts. See L. DowNiE, supra note 89,
at 206-09.
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In response to the reasoning and suggestions made here, some
may object that these proposals do not provide complete and final
protection for the courts, that the judiciary is still subject to pressure
from the other branches, still dependent on the people. To this objection there can be no completely satisfying or conclusive reply. The
administration of justice, like the provision of all governmental services,
is inescapably and ultimately in the hands of the electorate; it is their
decision whether they will suffer an outmoded system of justice.

